Introduction
In the summer of 2007 the "subprime mortgages" crisis started. These were a inancial product whose risks were spread among various agents and markets through securitization and credit derivatives. At irst, this situation did not affect the Spanish authorities directly, but it was one of the triggers of a chain of effects in global economies and inancial markets that soon, among other factors, would affect Spain.
Its immediate consequence was the deterioration of liquidity and funding, which drove several authorities to take support measures which had varying effects both over time and in inland areas of application.
In the case of Spain the passage from the crisis of the inancial economy to the real economy took less than a year from the appearance of the irst symptoms in North America. The Spanish economy fell into recession in late 2008. The fall in production and rising unemployment pushed up default rates of banks and savings banks and, consequently, the need for higher provisions of insolvency. Furthermore, there was an increase in inancial costs brought about by the increasing reliance on wholesale funding and also by sudden dificulties in these markets. In addition, the slowdown in the housing market affected many entities that had a high concentration in the ield of real estate development and construction (Aríztegui, 2011) .
With this background, it was already clear that there was an urgent need to undertake a restructuring of the sector and to support this process in a way that allowed the solvency to be strengthened of those institutions that decide to undertake plans to improve their eficiency through mergers or other integration transactions.
Clearly by late 2011, and throughout 2012 and 2013, we were witnessing an intense reorganization process of territorial inancial institutions (savings banks) which, forced by a series of regulatory rules, sought to strengthen the system and thus "solve the problems of liquidity, solvency and default of these entities" (Palomo, Sanchis-Palacio, & Gutiér-rez-Fernández, 2011) .
Consequently, savings banks a are in particular the main igures in the restructuring process. Their legislation reform involved signiicant changes in its legal form, with several variants. Thus, the adjustment to the declining demand gave rise to a situation of excess capacity, leading to an urgent need to resize the sector (González Sánchez & García Muiña, 2011) . All the savings banks, except Caixa Ontinyent and Pollensa, transferred their assets and liabilities to another entity regulated as commercial bank with the structure of a public limited company, in which those saving banks which have not been nationalized or taken over are major shareholders.
These circumstances are of suficient importance to merit research on whether these restructuring processes are improving the situation of the sector. We must point out that these restructuring processes are not unique of the Spanish Banking system. As we deep in the previous literature, we observe how these processes were carried out in other countries, even when the intensity of the crisis was not as worldwide as now. In this sense, we noted that several studies addressed the impact of the reform of the inancial systems in the sector from an international point of view. An example of this can be seen in Table 1 , although some of the studies are not strictly comparable in terms of full homogeneity, not only for the political systems in the respective countries but also for the type of problems, as they provide information on the intended purpose of restructuring examples in the banking sector at some level.
After this review, we observed how after the restructuring process there are two variables, eficiency and solvency, which in most cases improve considerably. This paper aims to be the irst in a series of observations over the next few years (until 2016 at least) and aims to ascertain, irst which inancial entities had higher eficiency and solvency values. It also seeks to discover whether the concentration decisions of the Spanish banking sector followed the guidelines according to the values obtained by these two variables and according to previous experiences in other contexts. After that irst goal, we thought it important to analyze the situation after the irst integrations and to provide the methodology, with the values of the ratios indicated, for analysis in future years.
Therefore, for proper monitoring and analysis, this paper is structured in ive sections. After the introduction, the second part provides a review of the development of those standards affecting the banking sector during 2009-2013. The third section describes the sample and presents the methodology and variables used in the analysis. Section 4 presents a Nowadays, the operating activities of saving banks and banks are identical. The unique difference is the legal form. This determines different management boards. Thorvald et al. (2004) For the particular case of Norway, mergers of troubled banks with larger solvent banks were chosen [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] In the case of Finland, the overall eficiency analysis shows that it is lower in merged banks than in non merged ones Kuussaari (1993 Kuussaari ( ) 1964 Kuussaari ( -1985 In Denmark and Finland, for example, mergers made the purchaser large enough to act independently abroad Fagerland Jacobsen (1997 ) Portugal 1990 -1995 Following the reform of the Portuguese banking system from 1986, the eficiency of new domestic banks in a more competitive banking system is quantiied Canhoto and Dermine (2003) South Africa 1999 Africa -2008 The analysis of the evolution of competition and eficiency of the banking sector shows a progressive decrease in the number of eficient banks. It also re ects the dominance of ive major banks that together represent more than 85% of total bank assets Mlambo and Ncube (2011) (2002) Source: own elaboration. the indings and Section 5 analyzes the entities that were involved in any restructuring process. The paper ends with the main conclusions and lines for future research.
Literature review
At a European level, several studies analyze the signiicant impact degree that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has on the competence of the banking sector in those countries which adopted the single currency (Bikker & Groeneveld, 2000; De Bandt & Davis, 2000) ; whether bank concentration in a national market has a negative impact on the inancial solvency of European banks (Uhde & Heimeshoff, 2009) or the determinants of bank proitability in several European countries, and also that a higher degree of concentration leads to a higher proitability (Molyneux & Thornton, 1992) . In this sense, international comparisons of banking eficiency can be used to identify, among others, issues of international consolidation of the banking industry. González (2009) analyzes the in uence of bank eficiency and policy variables on the market structure. Their results are consistent with the eficiency-structure hypothesis, which states that the most eficient banks have, on average, higher levels of domestic market that enhance market concentration.
Studies have demonstrated appropriate values of eficiency and solvency of the Spanish banking sector, mainly in late 2008 (Álvarez, 2008; Maudos, 2009b) . In this sense, although this eficiency had fallen from 2007, in 2008 it stood at 47%. As regards degree of solvency, in December 2008, with a value of 11.3%, Spain was at levels close to the European average (11.9% in the EU-15), well above the minimum required 8%. (Maudos, 2009a) . However, in 2010, eficiency deteriorated. Bigger banks were more eficient than the industry average (Maudos, 2011) . As for the differences between banks and savings banks, previous studies show how the savings banks are less eficient and solvent than banks. Fernández de Guevara (2007) Other studies show how in banks and savings banks there is a signiicant positive correlation between measures of size, eficiency and inancial proitability (Marín, Gómez, & Gómez, 2008) or Bernad, Fuentelsaz, & Gómez (2009) , who claim that although it seems that mergers and acquisitions have sometimes been an effective way to deal with increased competition deriving from the new competitive environment, they do not always manage to improve the results of the entities involved. Moreover, other studies like Fernández, Fonseca, and González (2006) ind that banks take more risks than savings banks, and Fonseca and González (2005) state that as the political presence increases on savings banks, so does their risk, as they may take riskier investments in the pursuit of political ends. The possibility of transferring funds in the commercial relationship between savings banks and regional governments can also favor risky investments, especially in saving banks with higher levels of public participation.
Elsewhere, the latest stress test published (September 2012) for a number of entities, shows this initial trend of solvency strength behind decisions made.
Regulatory developments 2009-2013
Apart from the legal aspects of the savings banks and their need to transform and update as a consequence of the necessary adaptation to European directives, (including the initial deinition of the Fund for Restructuring and Banking management), we can state that it was not until late 2011, early 2012, when the standards, were issued (and measures of economic and inancial policy), were clearly determined in Spain regarding restructuring and, especially, decreasing the debt of the inancial system.
In this sense, we brie y show in Figure 1 synopsis and content of the standards and their evolution from 2009-2013.
As a result of all this legislation, several steps were taken to restructure the sector, as is shown in Table 2 .
Without doubt, there will still be changes made in the last column, so it is important to note the content and results of the so-called stress test. The last one made in Spain points to a "clear exit point" from what we have commented on above in terms of future changes.
The stress tests have sought to assess the resilience of the banking system, and banks' ability to absorb possible shocks related to their credit risks and the market, including the risk arising from investments in sovereign debt. Two macroeconomic scenarios were mainly considered: a reference and an adverse one. The latter will determine the potential need for additional capital. It states the mechanism to protect the owners of products like hybrid capital instruments and subordinated debt and other financial measures.
12 april: RD 256/2013 Corporative Govern: to evaluate the capacity of the people who are managing the credit institution. Three basic objectives: 1) consolidation of balance sheets of banks, adversely affected by the deterioration of real estate assets; 2) creation of incentives which provide an appropriate and efficient overcapacity adjustment and 3) strengthening of the governance institutions resulting from the integration processes.
11 May: RD Ley 18/2012
An attempt to dispel the uncertainties that are hindering the normalization of the Spanish financial sector and the recovery of its activity of directing the savings to the real economy, focusing on sanitation, as fast as possible, of real estate assets.
31 August : RD Ley 24/2012
Focused on regulating clearly and effectively the possible cases of restructuring in credit institutions, instruments and measures to be taken for each, and the effects that these instruments and measures may produce. In Europe, the European Banking Authority (EBA) published the stress tests of the European Union for the years 2010 and 2011 and announced that it would not conduct new stress tests for 2012, with the next stress test for European banks to be in 2014. Nevertheless in Spain, in a clear attempt to be transparent, a series of additional stress test, in addition to the European ones, were made in 2012.
A summary of the stress tests carried out by the Spanish banking sector is presented in Table 3 . We show the estimated capital needs for the Spanish banking sector under an adverse scenario.
It is important to note that changes in the methodology, along with others in how results are presented, makes it dificult to compare results.
Sample, variables and method

Sample
Our study population comprises the Spanish credit institutions and, within them, the two main types of entities: banks and confederated saving banks. To accurately determine our initial sample (12/31/2008) we use, irst, the information provided by the Spanish Banking Association (AEB), from which we selected the top 6 Spanish banks by asset volume. We also took information from the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks (CECA), which records the existence of 45 savings banks. Therefore, the target population to analyze is set initially at 51 institutions (6 banks and 45 savings banks).
The economic and inancial information of the entities that was used to develop the empirical study was taken from the AEB and CECA websites and that concerning the stress test from the website of the Bank of Spain. Table 4 shows in detail the evolution of the sample by years. We observed how from a total of 51 institutions in 2008 there are just 15 in 2012, because of the restructuring processes, which implied mergers, acquisitions and SIP. Variables a. Dependent variable Taking into account that the main objective of our study is to determine, before and after the restructuring of the Spanish credit institutions, the degree and distinction between eficiency and solvency, our dependent variables are:
Eficiency Ratio (EFIC): this indicator measures which processing costs (salaries, technology, rent, supplies, administrative expenses, etc.) an entity must bear to get a regular unit margin (net inancial interests plus mediation commissions). Therefore, an entity will be more eficient if it applies lower processing costs for each unit of gross income generated. The variable is calculated for each entity as Operating Expenses/Gross income. This indicates that the smaller the ratio, the greater the eficiency. Solvency ratio (SOLV): this shows the ability of the entity to pay debts with its own resources. The variable is calculated for each entity as Equity/Current Liabilities. The higher this ratio, the higher the solvency.
b. Independent variable
To address the objective, we sought to combine simplicity (given the public inancial data available) and clarity with proper intellectual rigor, so we have relied on an explanatory variable and four more control variables:
1. Before/After restructuring (RESTR): we created a variable that classiies the sample before and after the restructuring. Given that these restructuring processes began in 2011 (annual accounts iled in 2012), we consider as before the years 2008-2010 and the subsequent ones as after the process.
Thus we have a dichotomous variable (RESTR) which takes the value 0 for the information referred to 2008-2010 ("before restructuring") and value 1 for the 2011-2012 information ("after restructuring").
As for the control variables, irst we added two variables that must be associated with levels of eficiency and solvency:
1. Stress Test (TEST). According to these tests, the need for additional capital of some entities could be related to our dependent variables, explaining that in more eficient and / or solvent institutions the need for capital requirements will be lower. This feature is shown with a numeric variable. As discussed above, the test included both a reference scenario and an adverse scenario. In order to calculate the Stress Test variable, we considered the adverse scenario for the whole bank (we analyzed banks on a whole. No branches). 2. Tier1 (TIER), will also be analyzed, given that entities with a higher level of own funds must re ect better eficiency and/or solvency ratios. The measure of this characteristic is the percentage of Tier 1.
Finally, we also included as control variables the size of the institutions and whether they are savings banks or banks in order to see if there is a differentiation between the two:
1. Banks or Savings Banks (B_S): Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if it is a Bank and 0 if it is a Savings Bank. 2. Size (SIZE) is measured by the logarithm of the value of assets in millions of euros.
Method
The analysis seeks to answer the question of whether the restructuring process of the banking sector followed the guidelines of eficiency and solvency of the sector. We use a multivariate model that allows us to verify the predictive capability of our previously deined explanatory variable, RESTRit, where each entity is i and year is t: With this model we analyze the capacity of the explanatory variable to predict two versions of the dependent variable, Xit, the eficiency (EFFICit), deined as the ratio between operating expenses and gross income, and solvency (SOLV it ), deined as the ratio between equity and liabilities.
With the above model, we analyze the regression of two versions, depending on whether the dependent variable is eficiency or solvency. Table 5 shows the mean, standard deviation and percentiles 25.50 (median) and 75 of the analysed variables. In order to go deeper into the relationship between the variables, we show in Table 6 their correlation coeficients. It is observed how these coeficients could be described as fair values and, therefore, we can state that multicollinearity is not a problem in our models, since the variance in ation factor (VIF) used to ensure that our results are not biased by the correlation between the explanatory variables (Marquardt, 1970) is, in all cases, within acceptable limits (Guajarati, 1997) .
Results
In order to clarify the explanatory model, we show the Granger causality test.
Ef ciency:
Variable de nition: Source: own elaboration. The test is performed by comparing the F statistic, given by:
Fort the analyzed case, we have: m=1 n=134 k=6 On the other hand, the SSR are shown in the following tables,
Unrestricted model (U):
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE Therefore, we conclude that restructuring has no effect on solvency according to Granger. Table 7 provides the mean value of the main variables analyzed. It is calculated according to the RESTR variable. The value of the Mann Whitney and the associated signiicance level are also given.
The results show how the two variables present better values on simple average before the restructuring process than later, which is logical at this irst stage. These differences are statistically signiicant for the EFFIC variable. Table 8 shows the evolution of the two variables for the Spanish banking sector during the period 2008-2012. We note that until 2011, the two variables get worse, with eficiency being hit harder, rising from 50.01 in 2009 to 64.28 in 2011. However in 2012 there is a change of trend and both variables begin to improve. In both cases the inancial decisions of integration taken could be the explanation. Tables 9 and 10 show the comparison, for each year, of eficiency and solvency for both Banks and Saving Banks. We must take into account that the restructuring process of the banking sector led to the grouping of savings banks in SIP that inally ended in the creation of banks. We must point out that those banks created through SIP among saving banks, were still included in the group of savings banks when presenting the data. This is because they originally came from savings banks and in the analysis period they are still in an initial process of restructuring. First, we note that the eficiency of banks is better than the savings banks. These differences are statistically signiicant for the years 2008, 2009 and 2011. Thus, our irst research question, about eficiency, conirms as valid those inancial policy decisions proposed as more eficient from the economic and inancial point of view. That is, the legal transformation of the savings banks, their absorption by the banks and/or their integration to become banks.
Similarly, for solvency, it is observed how the solvency of banks is better than savings banks. These differences are statistically signiicant for the years 2009, 2011 y 2012. Therefore, the above comments for eficiency would be the same for solvency. Table 11 shows the results of regression models 1 and 2. The results obtained are entirely consistent with what was indicated in the descriptive analysis. For Model 1, where the dependent variable is eficiency, RESTR variable re ects a positive relationship in the coeficient and a statistically signiicant value. This positive relationship in the coeficients is just conirming that eficiency in the banking sector was, on average, better before the restructuring than later. This would be explained by the fact that the restructuring process which would bear fruit in subsequent years began in 2011. This shows that those with better eficiency and solvency are the ones which must offset the lower values of the rest, which explains the drop in average after the initial restructuring.
Analysis
Meanwhile, variables SIZE and TIER re ect a negative relationship in the ratio and return statistically signiicant values. This negative relationship indicates that larger institutions are more eficient than smaller ones. Also, entities with the highest percentage of Tier1 ratio have higher eficiency than those with the lowest percentage of Tier1.
As for model 2, where the dependent variable is solvency, results show that B_S and TIER variables re ect a positive relationship in the ratio and have statistically signiicant values. These positive relationships indicate that banks have better solvency ratio than savings banks and that those which show the highest percentage of Tier1 have higher solvency ratios.
Conclusions
As a result of the general economic situation, the Spanish inancial system was forced to undertake a restructuring process, which inally began in late 2011 -annual accounts presented in June / July 2012 -and during the years 2012-2013. The existence and dis-posal of the annual accounts after the application of 2011 and 2012 provides consistency to our study. This paper, in its main research question and from the public inancial data available, conirms that:
Any transformation of savings banks into banks follows a logical criterion of inancial policy. Solvency and eficiency values of the Banks are better than those of the savings banks. These differences increase over the period 2008-2012. These results conirm related previous studies such as Fernández de Guevara (2007) ; Carbó and Maudos (2010) and Climent (2013) .
We conirm that these processes have not been yet fruitful in terms of the values obtained by the Spanish inancial institutions in their ratios of eficiency and solvency but no doubt they will in the future, especially considering the legislative decisions taken in late 2011 and throughout 2012, and inancial information containing the irst inancial statements published after restructuring.
Indeed, from the second analysis made, which is justiied because of the data-set that it provides, which means we can carry through this investigation in the following years (2013-2016), we can conclude that:
Opposite to the main question, the second one indicates that the eficiency and solvency of banks and savings banks was higher, in global, before the restructuring. This is explained by the short management time to enable improvements in eficiency and solvency. Also, the best entities absorb or integrate those which showed the worst indexes. According to previous studies cited, the improvements in eficiency in the restructuring processes require a clear legal framework; macroeconomic conditions and proper time to manage the new entities. This was started in late 2011 and continued decisively throughout 2012, so this variable will begin to improve results from 2013 and 2014, as was conirmed in previous studies of different countries and inancial systems analyzed in this work. Nevertheless, in one of the new groups an improvement in solvency was observed. This is justiied by the strengthening of own resources obtained via Government aid. Thus, it appears that this measure advocated by, among others things, the stress test, is very successful, either through diminished sale of risk, state capitalization or the market. In this regard, further evidence was obtained that the institutions with the highest eficiency are those that do not need additional capital according to the results of the stress test performed.
In short, we can say that these results justify the need for further steady implementation and control of the reform processes in the Spanish banking sector. The experience of previous restructuring processes shows that, although they certainly do require time, it is probably harmful to extend them too much, as this involves uncertainty in the market and the main agents related to these institutions. Therefore, the decisions taken on economic and inancial policy which establish deadlines and coercive criteria seem to be correct, because previous literature conirms that restructuring should be done in a decisive and quick way, with regulatory intervention and keeping investors and several other agents in the process informed.
Regarding the future research lines, we understand the need to supervise the future development of both main variables analyzed (proitability and solvency). We would also like to check if, as we understand that it will happen, the evolution of both variables will still be positive and will increase when the restructuring processes come to an end.
